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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of labor regulation on employment for Bolivian registered 
manufacturing firms during 1988 to 2007. By estimating job flows we find that firms with high 
temporary worker rates (as a proxy of lower labor regulation costs) are those with both higher job 
reallocation rates and higher net employment growth, and only they contributed to employment 
growth during the country economic downturn, 1998-1999. In addition, by estimating demand 
functions we find that labor regulation changes (measured through the compulsory basic salary and 
the major labor costs derived from the new pension law) entailed costs in terms of permanent 
employment losses. 
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I. Introduction 
The employment and labor regulation relationship is a key topic in labor economics in order 
to evaluate the importance of norms to explain labor market outcomes. This issue is 
especially relevant for Bolivia for two contrasted reasons. First because labor regulation has 
high standards that increased even further since 2006, which made the country rank among 
the highest in the world in this regard (see, e.g., the Employing Workers Indicators of the 
World Bank and the Labor Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation). Second because 
workers’ rights have been applied in practice to only a fraction of the labor force. For 
instance, in 2007 only 9.9 percent of urban workers had jobs subject to labor regulation 
(Muriel and Ferrufino, 2012). 
Besides the importance of this issue for Bolivia, as far as we know there are no empirical 
studies that highlight the effects of labor norms on the labor market outcomes, aside from 
cross-country studies in which the country applies to one observation (see, e.g., Botero et al. 
2004, Heckman and Pagés 2004, and Kaplan 2009). 
In this respect, this research analyzes the effects of labor regulation on employment 
outcomes for the formal manufacturing firms through two approaches: job flows, and labor 
demand functions. In both cases the information used is an unbalanced and broken panel 
for 1988-2007 of Bolivian registered manufacturing firms, which has been constructed for 
this research.1 
We set up two variables that permit to measure labor regulation at the firm level. The first 
variable is the rate of temporary workers over total permanent salaried workers. This 
indicator  controlled for other possible explanations  reveals firm’s preferences for labor 
regulation enforcement; which is associated with selecting temporary workers, and paying a 
basic salary, over permanent workers providing all workers’ rights besides the basic salary. 
The second variable considers labor regulation accounting costs as a tax (or taxes) 
proportional to the monthly basic salary. In addition, we use the Rigidity of Employment 
Index  constructed by the World Bank  noting that it is at the country level. 
Job flow indicators are developed following Davis et al. (1996), Haltiwanger and Schuh 
(1999), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002), and Haltiwanger et al. (2006). Initially we 
explore the main stylized facts emerging from these variables alone, observing that: first, job 
flows have relatively low magnitudes compared with the experiences of other countries (see 
Davis et al. 1996). Second, net employment increases at different average rates during the 
period of analysis, following the business cycles to some extent. In particular, more jobs 
were destroyed than created in the economic recession period of 1998-1999, and the highest 
net employment growth rate is observed in the economic expansion period of 2006-2007. 
Lastly, we find that net employment growth is relatively more volatile for non-production 
workers than for production workers, but the destruction of jobs is more severe for 
production workers in periods of economic downturn. 
                                                   
1 Registered firms are those that are registered in the Bolivian Tax Service Institution, and hence considered formal. 
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Next we analyze empirically the links between job flows and labor regulation. The most 
striking results are that firms with high temporary workers rates have higher job 
reallocation rates as well as higher net employment growth; even controlling for other 
relevant variables. In addition, we find that firms with a high proportion of temporary 
workers were the only type of firms that contributed positively to the net creation of jobs 
during the period of economic downturn, 1998-1999. 
For the second approach we estimate employment-salary elasticities from labor demand 
functions, considering separately production and non-production workers. We find that an 
increase of 1 percent in labor costs decreases the demand for production workers by 0.49 
percent, and the demand for non-production workers by 0.43 percent. These estimations 
permit to evaluate the impact of labor regulation changes on employment through micro-
simulations. In particular, we analyze the mandatory basic salary increase during 2006-
2009, and the new labor costs – proportional to the salary – derived from the new pension 
system since 2010. In the first simulation, we show that the costs in terms of job losses 
represent 5.7 percent for production workers and 4.8 percent for non-production workers. 
In the second simulation, employment demand decreased by 1.2 percent for production 
workers, and by 1.0 percent for non-production workers. 
Lastly, by including the Rigidity of Employment Index in the demand functions, we find that 
labor protection rules have a negative impact on production workers demand, which is more 
relevant since 2006, as a consequence of the new norms. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents a brief overview of labor 
regulation in Bolivia. Section III describes the methodology used in both approaches.  
Section IV provides a detailed description of the data focusing on the linkages of firms 
across time. Section V shows the job flow indicators and correlations with labor regulation. 
Section VI discusses the labor demand estimations and the impact of labor regulation costs 
on employment. Finally, Section VII presents the conclusions. 
II. Labor Regulation in Bolivia: An Overview 
Bolivian fundamental workers’ rights were created in 1939 with the enactment of the 
General Labor Decree, which became law in 1942. This law stipulates two main types of 
labor contracts, indefinite and temporary, which differ significantly in rights and, hence, in 
labor costs.2 Indefinite contracts allow workers to have all labor rights, including job 
security, bonuses, and social insurances. Fixed-term contracts undertake only the labor 
payment;3 however, they cannot last more than one year, can be renewed only once, and 
must be of short-term work type (becoming indefinite otherwise).  
Job security for workers with indefinite contracts has been modified over time. During 
1985-2005 labor rules permitted dismissals but with compensations paid by firms: a 
                                                   
2 A third type of contract is for specific tasks or services. Though, this is not a proper employer-employee relationship 
but rather employer-self-employed or employer-micro firm relationships. 
3 Since 2009 the government determined that these contracts are subject to all labor rights. 
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severance payment of three monthly salaries if the employer did not announce the dismissal 
90 days in advance, and a compensation of one monthly salary per year of work if the 
worker had more than five years working in the firm (the latter being applied even for 
voluntary retirements). Layoffs without any compensation were justified only under “bad 
workers behaviors”. That is to say, when workers intentionally damaged work instruments, 
revealed firm industrial secrets, were careless with industrial safety, had more than six days 
of absence without justification, did not comply with the labor contract, or stole from the 
company. Furthermore, some firms hired workers using civil contracts, which were hired 
under the civil code, thus paying only a basic salary. 
In May of 2006 the job security policy changed towards greater protection. Since then, 
dismissals and civil contracts has been prohibited, and layoffs has been justified only under 
the mentioned “bad workers behaviors”. Nevertheless, if a bad behavior cannot be legally 
proved, a worker can accept to be fired, but receiving all the dismissal compensations 
described above. 
In 2009 the Bolivian government established two additional job security rules. First, Job 
immovability was determined for both parents during the pregnancy period, until the child 
reaches one year of age.4 Second, the compensation of one monthly salary per year of work 
was extended for employees with less than five years of work in the firm. 
Bolivian labor regulation has also a dense salary policy for workers with indefinite contracts. 
The monthly basic salary has to be at least equal to the national minimum salary,5  and since 
2007 this has a mandatory yearly lower bound increase. Besides the basic salary, this policy 
includes: i) Christmas, profit, and (non-compulsory) production yearly bonuses, each one 
usually equal to one monthly basic salary, ii) a quinquennium that corresponds to five 
monthly basic salaries paid every five years, iii) a monthly salary for Sundays for production 
workers, v) a monthly seniority bonus, vi) a monthly border area bonus, and vii) surcharges 
for overtime, work in days off, national holidays or at night. 
In terms of social security, the Bolivian regulation has established that firms must be 
commitment with their workers’ health. In this regard, the most relevant rules are: i) health 
insurance payment, around 10 percent of the monthly basic salary; and ii) the salary 
payments and other compensations to mothers during downtimes due to pregnancy (forty-
five days before and forty-five days after the birth of the child) as well as due to 
breastfeeding. 
Since 1956, the Bolivian social security has included the pension system, but with two 
fundamental modifications over time. The first change was made in 1996 when the system 
passed from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system. In both cases contributions 
were proportional to the monthly basic salary paid twelve times per year. In the former 
system contributions were given by employees (8.8 percent on average), employers (4.5 
                                                   
4 This rule used to benefit only mothers. 
5 This policy also applies to temporary workers. 
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percent) and government (1.5 percent) (von Gersdorff, 1997). In the later system firms had 
to pay only 1.71 for labor risk insurance, and employees 12.21 percent. 
The second fundamental modification was made in 2010. The pension law became an 
hybrid of the two previous systems. Contributions were increased to thirteen times per year, 
including payments with the Christmas bonus, and other contributions were added for a 
new solidarity pension fund. These lasts contributions are paid by firms (3 percent), and by 
employees (0.5 percent), including a scale between 1 to 10 percent applied progressively to 
higher salaries. 
The Bolivian workers’ rights described briefly above have been ranked among the highest 
standards in the world;6 however, they have covered only a small fraction of the labor force. 
For instance, according to the Household Survey of 2007, for urban workers over 14 years 
old: i) only 19.3 percent of them have secure jobs; ii) 28.3 percent receive Christmas bonus 
and 6.8 percent receive profit and/or production bonuses; iii) 19.3 percent are affiliated 
with the pension system; and iv) 24.3 percent have health insurance. Only 9.9 percent of 
urban workers have at the same time job security, health insurance coverage, retirement 
pension contributions and the Christmas bonus. In addition, these workers have, on 
average, more years of schooling, more experience and better economic conditions 
compared with the rest (see Muriel and Ferrufino, 2012). 
III. Methodology 
We analyze the links between employment and labor regulation considering two 
approaches. The first method consists of constructing job flow indicators in order to have a 
comprehensive understanding of employment dynamics over time, and the role that labor 
rights play on these changes. The second approach consists of estimating static labor 
demand functions, which permits to analyze the impact of labor regulation, and its relevant 
changes on employment. Each methodology is discussed in detail below. 
III.1. Job Flow Indicators 
Job flow indicators are constructed following Davis et al. (1996), Haltiwanger and Schuh 
(1999), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002), and Haltiwanger et al. (2006). Table 1 shows 
these indicators, which are standard in the job flows literature. 
Gross job creation at time t is defined as the employment gains summed over all firms that 
expand or start up between t-1 and t, while job destruction at time t equals employment 
losses summed over all firms that contract or shut down between t-1 and t.7 Usually job 
destruction is expressed as a positive number so that net employment changes are measured 
                                                   
6 See, for example, the Employing Workers Indicators of the World Bank and the Labor Freedom Indexes of the 
Heritage Foundation. 
7 Ideally the unit of observation is a plant rather than a firm, but data at the plant level are not available for the 
Bolivian manufacturing case. 
 5
as the difference between job creation and destruction. These flows can be expressed as 
rates by dividing them by the total number of jobs as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Job Flow Indicators 
Indicators At the Firm/Plant Level At the Sector Level 
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Source: Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger (2006). 
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The sum of the job creation rate and the job destruction rate gives the job reallocation rate, 
while the difference is the net employment growth rate. In other words, job creation and 
destruction figures decompose the net employment change into a component associated 
with growing firms and a component associated with shrinking firms. In addition, a 
measure of churning or reallocation of jobs, which is over and above the number of job 
reallocations necessary to accommodate a given net aggregate employment growth rate, is 
the excess job reallocation rate, and is defined as the job reallocation rate minus the 
absolute value of the net aggregate employment growth rate. 
The literature points out that labor regulation may reduce job creation, job destruction, and 
job reallocation, which may lead to a negative effect on net employment growth. Typically, 
this analysis has been performed by using a difference-in-difference approach, studying 
cross-country differences in order to have labor regulation variability (e.g., Micco and Pagés 
2004, Haltiwanger et al. 2006, and Kaplan 2009). However, given that we are interested 
only in a single country we construct an indicator related with labor regulation enforcement 
at the firm level: the rate of temporary workers over total permanent salaried workers. 
As discussed above, temporary workers have had both fixed-term contracts and civil 
contracts, meaning lower labor regulations costs in terms of flexibility, non-coverage of 
social insurance, and non-payment of bonuses, among others. In this regard, this indicator 
is used to classify firms by their labor contract preferences, which are associated with 
regulation enforcement of selecting temporary workers versus permanent workers. 
In addition, we reinforce the employment and labor regulation correlation by estimating the 
following regression (see Haltiwanger et al. (2006) for a discussion of this approach at the 
country level): 
(1)  jt
w
wjtw
r
rjtrjtRRNG udz    ),(  
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where jtRRNG ),( represents the job reallocation rate or the net employment growth rate of 
workers in firm j at time t; rjtz is the labor regulation indicator r; wd  is the w
th relevant 
observed firm characteristic that affects job flows; the alphas and betas are the coefficients 
to be estimated and jtu is the idiosyncratic error independent and normally distributed.  
We consider two labor regulation indicators in (1); the rate of temporary workers at the firm 
level, described above, and the Rigidity of Employment Index constructed by the World 
Bank at the country level. We notice that the hiring of temporary workers has been 
motivated not only to evade costs related to permanent contracts but also to conciliate firms’ 
employment needs with their production characteristics, such as business cycles. In this 
respect, we adjust this rate by these characteristics to avoid any bias that can change the 
sign in the estimations. 
III.2. Labor Demand 
The impact of labor regulation costs on employment is analyzed through static labor 
demand functions where – besides the indicators described above – these costs are  
approximated as a tax (or taxes) proportional to the basic salary (e.g., Hamermesh 1993, 
Paes de Barros et al. 1999, and Heckman and Pagés 2004). Furthermore, this approach is 
used to evaluate labor regulation changes in recent years through micro-simulations (e.g., 
Kesselman et al. 1977, Nissin 1984, Gruber 1997 and Peichl and Sieglochz 2010). 
The specification of the labor demand function is based on several assumptions, which are 
discussed for the case of the Bolivian registered manufacturing sector. The first issue is 
regarding the endogeneity problem between employment and salaries. We consider that 
firms subject to labor regulation costs can establish their salary that, in turn, will allow them 
to hire more productive workers given the benefits linked to regulation. 
The previous hypothesis is supported by the following facts. As mentioned above, a very low 
proportion of the urban employed population is covered by labor regulation, and it is, on 
average, more qualified as compared to the rest of the workers. In addition, Muriel (2011) 
shows, through earnings regressions, that salaried workers with both pension system 
affiliation and Christmas bonus have higher labor earnings, even controlling for years of 
schooling, experience, economic sector, and firm size. This result means that, on average, 
workers subject to labor regulation are better-paid and probably more productive compared 
to those that are not subject to regulation. 
The second issue relates to the choice, among various options, of the best functional form of 
the production function. In this case, following Christensen et al. (1973),8 Berndt and 
Christensen (1973) and Binswanger (1974), the translog (transcendental logarithmic) 
production function is chosen because it has a generic technological specification that takes 
into account second-order effects. 
                                                   
8 L.R. Christensen, D.W. Jorgenson and L.J. Lau (1970), “Conjugate Duality and the Transcendental Logarithmic 
Production Function”; see reference in Binswanger (1974). 
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The usual Cobb-Douglas and CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) production functions 
are discarded because they impose restrictions on the elasticities: the elasticity of 
substitution for all factors is one in the first case and constant in the second case. The 
generalized Leontief and the CES translog, which also account for second-order effects, are 
also discarded because of their limitations in empirical estimations. In the first case the 
relationship between employment and salaries is derived from the estimated constant of the 
regression that can, in practice, represent other unobserved relevant factors related to labor 
demand. In the second case the function does not easily allow calculations for multiple 
inputs and firm characteristics (other than inputs) given its non-linear specification (see 
Hamermesh 1995). 
The last issue is related to the variable used empirically as production: value-added or gross 
product. In this case, the available data allow using the gross product, taking advantage of 
richer information.9 
Taking into account the previous assumptions, we assume that a representative firm j 
subject to labor regulation wants to minimize its costs given y units of production. The 
problem of the firm j in a given period can be written as: 
(2)   MjMjKjKjUjUjSjSj xwxwxwxwmin   
jrMjKjUjUjSjSj yzxxxqxqfthatsuch );,,,(
 
where ijx  is the quantity of factor i (= S, U, K, and M) in firm j, which are, respectively, non-
production workers, production workers, physical capital, and intermediate consumption; 
ijw  is the return of factor i in firm j;
 
)(f
 
is the production function assumed to be twice 
differentiable and concave; ijq  (i= S, U) is the quality of employment of type i in j, resuming 
skills in terms of education, experience, abilities, training, etc.; and rz is the Rigidity of 
Employment Index specified in expression (1). Notice that we divide employment into 
production and non-production workers in order to capture specific employment-salary 
elasticities for these types of jobs. 
The employment returns include all labor regulation costs paid by the firm: basic salary, job 
security, bonuses, and social insurances. For simplicity we assume that these costs are 
proportional to the basic salary: ijijij ww )1(  , where 
c
ijcij   and c refers to each 
specific regulation cost.
 The representative firm is willing to incur on higher labor costs derived from the labor 
regulation only if it can employ workers of a higher level of quality, to obtain higher labor 
                                                   
9 Another issue is related to the goods market structure, which shapes (together with other variables) the labor 
demand function. In order to be consistent with imperfections in the labor market we follow Muriel (2004), who 
develops a Hotelling model with transportation costs. In equilibrium, prices are equal to the price level that would 
prevail under perfect competition plus a percentage of these associated with transport. This result is not described 
explicitly because it is not needed for the purpose at hand. 
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productivity. This behavior is modeled by introducing a relationship between both variables, 
following Oi (1990):10 
(3) ))~(~,( ijijijiij qwqgw  , i= S, U 
with 01, ig , 02, ig , 011, ig  
where )(ig  is a twice differentiable function relating the salary with labor quality as well as 
with earnings in the rest of the labor market ( ijw
~ ), for a given quality ( ijq
~ ).11 The 
representative firm then minimizes its costs with respect to the two types of employment, 
physical capital, intermediate consumption, and salaries. This problem gives a new 
condition for salaries 
(4) 
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which means that the incremental cost of the salary derived from an additional infinitesimal 
rise in quality is equal to the average of the salary per unit of quality (see Oi 1990). 
The cost function is then described as: 
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12 
                                                   
10 This approach follows also efficiency salary models; however, we use quality as an exogenous variable and not effort 
as an endogenous variable (see Stiglitz 1976, Solow 1979, Yellen 1984, Akerlof and Yellen 1986). 
11 One way of defining this variable is: 
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representative firm,  
ix  is the total employment of type i (supposed equal to this labor force for simplicity), 'ijx  is the 
employment in the unit of production j’ (considering all units in the economy including self-employed workers units), 
and )( '' ijij qw  is the corresponding earnings of the unit of production j’ given that the quality of employment is 'ijq .
 
 
12 Notice that we assume a cross effect between rz
 
and ijv . 
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Expression (5’) is derived with respect to the returns of the factors of production to obtain 
the shares equations as regressions over time. 
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 by the Shepherd's Lemma, given the levels of labor quality and output, 
and  is the idiosyncratic error independent and normally distributed. 
The optimal relationship between salary and quality gives two additional equations to the 
system: expression (3) can be redefined as 11, )
~,(/)~,(  ijtijtijtijtijti qwqgwqg , i = S, U, which is 
integrated by ijtq in order to obtain the following equation for empirical estimation: 
  (4’) ijtijtitijt qlnwlnwln  0
 
, i = S, U 
where itw0 is the labor cost of factor i at time t when 1ijtq , and ijt is the idiosyncratic 
error independent and normally distributed. Given that employment in the representative 
firm is small compared with the entire workforce, itw0  is considered equal for each firm, 
and treated as a constant empirically.13 
Lastly, the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the relevant elasticities. In particular, 
Binswanger (1974) determines the own-salary elasticity of labor demand as 
(7) 1
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where iiˆ is the estimated value of ii . Unlike the usual system of equations for empirical 
estimations found in the literature (see Behar (2004) for a discussion), we contribute to it 
by adding a new equation (4’) to the system that we believe is consistent in a segmented 
labor market, were labor regulation coverage is very low, as it is the case here. In addition, 
as mentioned above, we avoid endogeneity problems, which will be analyzed in more detail 
below. 
IV. Data 
The data used corresponds to the Bolivian Annual Manufacturing Survey (BAMS) which is 
an unbalanced and broken panel of Bolivian manufacturing firms. The survey includes 
information of firms registered at the National Tax Service Institution (SIN). The survey was 
implemented for every year between 1988 and 2001 by the National Institute of Statistics 
                                                   
13 This means that for firms j and j”, ))
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(INE), and stopped until 2008, when INE implemented it again, asking for the information 
of years 2006 and 2007 at the same time.14 
In 2004, the INE applied the Amplified Survey of Economic Establishments (EAEE) that 
included firms from sectors of manufacturing, mining, education, health, and services. As 
this survey has information similar to those of the BAMS, for the manufacturing sector, we 
include also this information in our analysis. 
The original data is classified by different International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) revisions, but we harmonize them with ISIC revision 3.1. By merging all surveys, we 
end up with information of firms from 1988-2001, 2004 and 2006-2007. Different plants 
that belong to one firm are classified as different firms because they have different 
identification numbers. In fact the identification numbers also varied between the samples 
of 1988-1994 and the samples of 1995-2001. We harmonize also the identification numbers 
by looking at the name of the firms and sometimes by looking at the addresses.15 
Table 2: Number of Firms in the Unbalanced Panel by Size 
Year Micro Small % of Total Medium Large % of Total Total 
1988 1 403 49.09 279 140 50.91 823 
1989 118 355 53.57 257 153 46.43 883 
1990 263 394 61.81 253 153 38.19 1 063 
1991 111 210 44.65 238 160 55.35 719 
1992 187 305 53.77 249 174 46.23 915 
1993 41 357 47.66 264 173 52.34 835 
1994 66 310 47.06 246 177 52.94 799 
1995 62 305 50.97 209 144 49.03 720 
1996 8 266 43.42 190 167 56.58 631 
1997 0 357 48.77 209 166 51.23 732 
1998 3 438 51.10 230 192 48.90 863 
1999 34 409 52.80 216 180 47.20 839 
2000 58 183 47.72 128 136 52.28 505 
2001 64 220 47.89 158 151 52.11 593 
2004 380 351 69.75 189 128 30.25 1 048 
2006 164 335 48.59 289 239 51.41 1 027 
2007 164 328 48.71 281 237 51.29 1 010 
Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
Note: according to INE, micro firms are those with 0 to 4 workers, small-firms 5 to 14, medium-sized 15 to 49, 
and large 50 or more. Firm size determination includes permanent salaried and unsalaried workers, the latter 
being owners, workers who are family of the owners, and others. 
 
Table 2 presents the sample of firms by year. They are classified in four groups according to 
the number of permanent (salaried and unsalaried) workers.16 The average number of firms 
per year is 824, with the highest number in 1990 (1,063 firms) and the minimum in 2000 
(505 firms). In addition, firms are equally distributed: micro and small firms represent 
                                                   
14 In appendix we provide additional information of the sample selection methodology and the incomplete processing 
of the data by INE. 
15 For these reasons we say that INE did not complete the processing of the data. 
16 Unsalaried workers are owners, workers who are relatives of the owners, and others that do not receive any labor 
earnings. 
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approximately 50 percent, the same proportion as medium-sized and large firms. However, 
in 2004 more micro and small firms were included due to sample reasons, representing 
almost 70 percent of the sample.17 
We notice that there is a high increase in the number of medium-sized and large firms 
between 2004 and 2006; being 100 medium-sized firms more, and 111 large firms more, in 
2006. This is a relevant issue in terms of employment, because it represents an increase of 
57 percent of job for medium-sized firms, and of 60 percent for large firms, as it is observed 
in Table 3. In terms of employment, the data account, on average, for 36,626 permanent 
(salaried and unsalaried) workers per year. The year with the highest number of workers is 
2007 with 60,494, while the lowest number is of 2000 with 28,614. In addition, on average, 
92 percent of employment is in medium-sized and large firms. 
Table 3: Employment by Size of Firm 
Year Micro Small % of Total Medium Large % of Total Total 
1988 4 3 087 10.65 7 269 18 650 89.35 29 010 
1989 375 2 891 10.82 6 743 20 163 89.18 30 172 
1990 729 3 277 12.69 6 636 20 931 87.31 31 573 
1991 330 1 883 7.22 6 435 22 020 92.78 30 668 
1992 533 2 608 9.05 6 668 24 893 90.95 34 702 
1993 130 2 839 8.26 6 983 25 998 91.74 35 950 
1994 223 2 508 7.46 6 316 27 548 92.54 36 595 
1995 204 2 515 8.91 5 409 22 391 91.09 30 519 
1996 28 2 311 7.16 5 080 25 232 92.84 32 651 
1997 0 2 844 8.33 5 633 25 670 91.67 34 147 
1998 8 3 422 8.49 6 086 30 889 91.51 40 405 
1999 83 3 196 8.49 5 766 29 591 91.51 38 636 
2000 173 1 546 6.01 3 627 23 268 93.99 28 614 
2001 211 1 827 6.26 4 434 26 107 93.74 32 579 
2004 963 2 916 10.18 4 882 29 331 89.82 38 092 
2006 482 2 897 5.84 7 675 46 779 94.16 57 833 
2007 478 2 890 5.57 7 535 49 591 94.43 60 494 
Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
Note: according to INE, micro firms are those with 0 to 4 workers, small-firms 5 to 14, medium-sized 15 to 49, and 
large 50 or more. Firm size determination includes permanent salaried and unsalaried workers, the latter being 
owners, workers who are family of the owners, and others. 
 
In order to evaluate employment dynamics, Figure 1 analyzes the number of firms that exit, 
enter and continue by dividing the panel into two-year subpanels. In this pair-wise panel, 
continuing firms are defined as those that appear in two subsequent years (t-1 and t) 
regardless of whether they disappear or not in any other previous or subsequent year. 
Similarly, an entry firm is a firm that does not appear in period t-1, but does in period t, and 
an exit firm is one that appears in t-1, but not in t. In subpanel (a) we show the whole 
sample and in subpanel (b) the trimmed sample (only forced inclusion sample).18 
                                                   
17 This occurs because in 2004 the survey had other objectives, as it was an amplified survey of establishments. 
18 Since forced inclusion information is incomplete, we re-classified firms into this category. First, we re-classified as 
forced inclusion those firms that in 1988-2001 were classified as random in some years, but appeared in the database 
in consecutive years, but were classified as forced inclusion in most years. Second, the variable that classified firms as 
 12 
Figure 1: Continuing, Exit and Entry Firms 
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(a) Continuing, exit and entry firms (by pairs, all panel)
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(b) Continuing, exit and entry firms (by pairs, FI panel)
Cont. Exit Entry  
Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
 
The volatility induced by exit and entry firms is high in subpanel (a) compared to subpanel 
(b), being associated with the random sample inclusion in the first case. Furthermore, there 
is more stability in terms of continuing firms within specific sub-periods in subpanel (b), 
which can be related to the construction of the data. Thus, the different ISIC revisions used, 
the large exit of firms between 1999 and 2000, the large entry between 2001 and 2004 and 
the many continuing firms between 2006 and 2007, suggests that the forced inclusion 
sample is better for analyzing job flows. 
In this regard, we consider the pair-wise panel for this segment of firms. In addition, we 
take into account the sub-periods in which employment dynamics display stability, which 
means that job flows of 1994-1995, 1999-2000, 2001-2004, and 2004-2006 are not 
considered. We follow this strategy because we are not be able to corroborate that 
employment changes between those years are due to job creation and/or destruction or due 
to sample changes. 
IV.1. Construction of Variables 
The data required for the empirical analysis come mainly from BAMS, but we also use 
National Accounts Statistics and other relevant databases. Table 4 explains the construction 
of the variables used. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
random or mandatory was not reported by INE in 2004, 2006 and 2007, which made us to classify firms as random 
or mandatory according to the number of permanent employees. Lastly, we create a dummy variable for inclusion 
(equal to 1 if it is forced and 0 otherwise) and averaged it by firm for the years with information, which allows 
reclassifying firms as belonging to the random sample if their average value is below 0.5 or to the forced inclusion 
sample if the average is above or equal to 0.5. 
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Table 4: Firms’ Variables 
Quantity and Price Variables 
SUEixi ,,,   Total employment (E), salaried permanent workers and non-salaried workers (i.e. owners, and others that 
do not receive salaries), production workers (U), and non-production workers (S). 
Kx  Stock of capital (net balances of buildings, technical facilities, machinery, equipment, vehicles, computer 
equipment, etc.). The variable is in Bolivian currency, and has been converted to real values by the GDP 
investment deflator. 
y  Output measured by the gross value of production,19 and transformed to real values by the implicit GVP 
price of the input-output matrix (constructed for 16 manufacturing subsectors and harmonized with the ISIC 
revision 3.1). 
)( SU qqq   Employment quality, which is approximated by the ratio between firm labor productivity, and the 
corresponding manufacturing subsector labor productivity, and averaged over the years with information at 
the firm level.20 
SUEiwi ,,,   Total labor cost by unit of employment i, which is the sum of both the basic salary ( iw ) and regulation 
costs )( iiw . The regulation costs include compensations, Christmas and other bonuses, contributions to 
social security, and others paid by firms. 
Kw  Capital cost by unit, measured through the effective interest rate of the bank system estimated by the 
Central Bank of Bolivia.21 
Mw  Intermediate consumption price, which is constructed as a weighted average of two prices: the implicit 
intermediate consumption prices, obtained from the input-output matrix, and the temporary workers’ cost, 
approximated by the GDP consumption deflator. The weights are the corresponding costs over the 
composed intermediate consumption (i.e. intermediate consumption plus temporary workers’ cost). 
MM xw  Intermediate consumption costs are obtained by aggregating the nominal value of expenses on raw 
materials, auxiliary materials and packaging, basic services, and selected expenditures including the 
temporary workers’ cost. 
Other variables 
Temporary 
workers rate 
Ratio between temporary workers over salaried permanent employees.22 
Rigidity of 
employment 
Index that is part of the Doing Business Indicators of the World Bank, and averages three indicators: 
difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours and difficulty of laying off. We collect data from 2004, 2005 and 2007, we 
use the same values of 2004-2005 for 1988-2001 (given that labor security rules did not change over the 
1985-2005 period), and average the values of 2005-2007 for 2006 (given that the law changed in May of 
that year). 
 
                                                   
19 The variable is the sum of (according to INE’s definition) products, sub-products, commercial margin of products 
without transformation, revenues derived from own capital manufacturing, inventory changes of products in process, 
sales of electricity produced by the firms, and other operating incomes. 
20 Firm labor productivity corresponds to the nominal value of products and sub-products over (salaried and 
unsalaried) permanent employees. Labor productivity by subsector is equal to the nominal GVP derived from input-
output matrix data over the corresponding employment. Employment for the 16 subsectors is obtained using the 
Population Census of both 1992 and 2001 to estimate the participation of each subsector in manufacturing 
employment, and applying these percentages to the data on total manufacturing employment constructed by Muriel 
and Jemio (2010) for 1992-2007 and extrapolating growth rates for 1988-1991. 
21 This rate measures loans in US dollars (given that almost all loans were provided in this currency in Bolivia), and 
has been converted to Bolivian currency using the uncovered interest rate parity formula. 
22 Given that in 1988-1991 BAMS collected only data of temporary workers’ costs, we estimate a random effect model 
between the temporary workers’ rate and the relative labor cost (temporary workers’ costs over salaried permanent 
labor costs) in order to extrapolate temporary workers data for 1988-1991. Given the endogeneity problem between 
the variables, the relative labor cost is measured in a previous period. 
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Continuation Table 4 
Rigidity of 
employment 
Index that is part of the Doing Business Indicators of the World Bank, and averages three indicators: 
difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours and difficulty of laying off. We collect data from 2004, 2005 and 2007, we 
use the same values of 2004-2005 for 1988-2001 (given that labor security rules did not change over the 
1985-2005 period), and average the values of 2005-2007 for 2006 (given that the law changed in May of 
that year). 
Capital intensity
 
Capital per worker, calculated as: Ek xx
~/ , where Ex
~
 is average employment in a pair-wise period (see 
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996). 
Energy intensity Ratio between the cost of fuels plus electricity (deflated by the intermediate consumption price), and real 
gross value of production (see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996). 
Notes: i) nominal factor prices are normalized by the GDP consumption deflator (by one plus the growth rate of the GDP consumption deflator 
in the case of the capital price) when these variables are included alone in the regressions; 2) other relevant firms’ characteristics will be 
described in the empirical estimations. 
 
Summary statistics of the variables are given in Table 5 considering firms that have positive 
values of both permanent (salaried and unsalaried) workers, and gross value of production. 
Registered manufacturing firms have, on average, 45 workers of which 30 are production 
workers, and 14 are non-production workers. The share of the costs is concentrated in 
intermediate consumption, followed by employment (production and non-production 
workers) and capital. 
Table 5: Summary Statistics for 1988-2001, 2004, 2001-2007 
(13,635 observations) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Pearson Coef. of 
Variation 
Permanent workers (salaried and non-salaried) 45.361 112.083 2.471 
Production workers 30.064 83.966 2.793 
Non-production workers 14.457 40.556 2.805 
Gross value of production (1990 Bs.) 6 807 277 38 000 000 5.582 
Stock of capital  (1990 Bs.) 4 341 906 57 900 000 13.335 
Intermediate consumption (1990 Bs.) 3 846 502 18 500 000 4.810 
Employment quality proxy (rate) 4.814 9.024 1.875 
Salary_total employment  (1990 Bs.) 6 905 7 487 1.084 
Salary_production workers  (1990 Bs.) 5 242 5 314 1.014 
Salary_non-production workers  (1990 Bs.) 9 299 15 678 1.686 
Labor benefits payment rate 0.500 0.722 1.444 
Share of production workers 0.103 0.097 0.937 
Share of non-production workers 0.070 0.080 1.137 
Share of stock of capital  0.160 0.149 0.935 
Share of intermediate consumption 0.667 0.186 0.279 
Temporary workers rate 0.210 1.102 5.241 
Capital intensity(1) 9.90E-05 0.002 21.694 
Energy intensity(1) 0.255 11.409 44.800 
Proportion: D_main regions 0.812   
Proportion: D_export 0.139   
Note: (1) includes only 9,345 observations consistent with the job flows data. 
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V. Job Flows and Labor Regulation 
This section explores the main stylized facts emerging from the analysis of firms that belong 
to the forced inclusion sample. The stylized facts observed are: 1) job creation and 
destruction do not always respond in equal magnitudes over the cycle, 2) there is a relatively 
low magnitude of job flows, 3) there is a significant impact of the 1999 crisis on 
employment, and 4) the volatility of net employment change between production and non-
production workers. We review these stylized facts in turn below to motivate our analysis 
aimed at assessing the role of labor market regulation on employment.23  
Figure 2 
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Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
 
Figure 2 displays the cyclical behavior of manufacturing job flows by comparing the net and 
the gross job flow rates with the rate of growth of GDP. First, we can see that job destruction 
is countercyclical as the correlation between this measure and the net employment change is 
-0.82, while job creation is strongly pro-cyclical with a correlation coefficient of 0.95 with 
net employment growth. But most important, we can see that creation and destruction do 
not always move in opposite directions over the cycle. A particular interesting period is the 
recession of 1998 to 1999. The job creation rate fell by 13 percent in those years, while the 
destruction rate rose by 72 percent. In fact the correlation between job destruction and job 
creation is -0.59, indicating that the prevailing view of business cycle is not supported by the 
evidence of job flows in the Bolivian manufacturing sector.24 
Thus, the graphical correlations observed in Figure 2 leads us to the following stylized fact: 
                                                   
23 Jiménez and Landa (2004) have also estimated job flows for the Bolivian manufacturing sector, but covering only 
the 1996-1999 period.   
24 The prevailing view of the business cycle literature predicts a correlation between creation and destruction of -1.0 
and it is based upon the notion that most or all firms respond similarly to the cycle. In fact, this is how 
macroeconomists rationalize the use of representative agent’s models. 
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Stylized fact 1: Job creation and destruction rates do not always respond in similar 
magnitudes over the cycle, in particular during the recessions. 
Table 6 reports the rates of job creation, job destruction, job reallocation, net employment 
change, and excess labor reallocation for two-year periods and for the selected sub-periods 
(average). The first noticeable fact emerging from this yearly comparison is the moderate 
magnitude of job reallocation. Gross job flows (the sum of gross job creation and gross job 
destruction) ranged from 11.6 percent to 16.3 percent between 1989 and 2001. In the 2006-
2007 period the job reallocation rate rose to 18.2 percent, which is explained, among other 
reasons, by job creation due to the greater economic growth. Job creation has been higher 
than job destruction in all the two-year periods except 1998-1999, which is reflected in a 
negative rate of net employment of -3 percent. 
Table 6: Annual Job Flow Rates in Bolivian Manufacturing, 1989-2007  
Year 
Job 
Creation 
Job 
Destruction 
Job 
Reallocation 
Net Employ- 
ment Growth 
Excess Labor 
Reallocation 
1988-1989 9.1 5.0 14.1 4.1 10.0 
1989-1990 8.4 4.9 13.4 3.5   9.8 
1990-1991 7.6 4.7 12.3 2.9   9.4 
1991-1992 11.6 4.7 16.3 7.0   9.4 
1992-1993 10.0 4.9 14.8 5.1   9.7 
1993-1994 10.3 4.8 15.2 5.5   9.7 
1995-1996 8.6 4.7 13.3 3.9   9.4 
1996-1997 8.4 3.2 11.6 5.2   6.4 
1997-1998 7.2 5.5 12.8 1.7 11.1 
1998-1999 5.6 8.6 14.2 -3.0 11.2 
2000-2001 7.2 5.7 12.9 1.5 11.4 
2006-2007 14.2 4.0 18.2 10.1   8.1 
Sub-periods (average) 
1989-1994 9.5 4.8 14.4 4.7   9.7 
1996-1999 7.4 5.5 13.0 1.9   9.5 
2000-2001 7.2 5.7 12.9 1.5 11.4 
2006-2007 14.2 4.0 18.2 10.1   8.1 
  Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
 
The rate of job destruction never fell below 3 percent of manufacturing employment, and it 
reached as high as 8.6 percent in 1998-1999. Job creation rates, on the other hand, averaged 
9.5 percent in the 1989-1994 sub-period, which is certainly the period of greater economic 
stability due to the implementation of the First Generation Reforms in Bolivia.25 
Recall that excess job reallocation equals total job reallocation minus the minimum amount 
required to accommodate the net change in manufacturing employment. In other words, 
excess labor reallocation measures the extent of simultaneous job creation and destruction. 
According to Table 6, this indicator increased to 11.1, 11.2 and 11.4 percent in the periods of 
1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 respectively, being below 10 percent in the other sub-
                                                   
25 See Barja (2000) for a detailed review of the reforms implemented in Bolivia between 1986 and 2001. 
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periods. This shows that, in these periods that bound the period of economic downturn, a 
large fraction of employment opportunities changed locations. 
The job reallocation rate in Bolivia has been on average below 15 percent, expect in the sub-
period of 2006-2007. How does this moderate-scale job reallocation activity in Bolivia 
compare with the experiences of other countries? Davis et al. (1996) report net and gross 
job flow rates for selected developed and developing countries for periods before 1990. For 
the manufacturing industry in the United States, they find an average job reallocation rate 
of 19.4 percent for the 1972-1988 period. Morocco is the country with the highest rate (30.7 
percent) while Norway is the country with the lowest rate (15.5 percent). Thus, according to 
the international evidence, the reallocation of job opportunities in Bolivia represents the 
normal state of affairs for both developed and developing labor market economies. By these 
standards the Bolivian numbers are not particularly high, and in fact similar to the lower-
end.26 This allows us to state: 
Stylized fact 2: The Bolivian manufacturing sector is characterized by a relatively low 
magnitude of job flows. 
We already mentioned that the 1998-1999 period is the only one that displays a negative 
rate of net employment growth. This period is characterized by Calvo (2006) as Bolivia’s 
Sudden Stop. This sudden drop in GDP growth had external causes that translated into a 
higher cost of and limited availability of credit, forcing indebted firms to slow down 
production, and to enter into default on their bank loans. Even though this international 
shock hit the service sectors hardest (including construction and commerce), it is possible to 
consider that it also affected the manufacturing sector, particularly those firms that were 
highly dollar-indebted. Clearly we cannot state causality of the crisis with net employment 
changes, but it is possible to suppose that firms discarded jobs as a way to reduce costs. This 
allows us to state the third stylized fact.27 
Stylized fact 3: The net shrinkage of manufacturing employment in 1998-1999 can be 
attributed to the economic slowdown that the Bolivian economy experienced. 
Lastly, in Figure 3 we present the net employment growth rate for production and non-
production workers of the manufacturing industry in Bolivia for the different sub-periods. 
Notice that the rate of growth of net employment for non-production workers is relatively 
more volatile than the rate of growth for production workers. However, when there is a fall 
in the rate of growth of net employment, the fall is more severe for production workers than 
for non-production workers. In particular, the decrease in net employment has been -4.4 
                                                   
26 Jiménez and Landa (2004) found that manufacturing firms reallocated jobs at an annual average rate of 25 percent 
in the 1996-1999 period, with a net employment growth rate of 2.2 percent, which was attributed to a job creation rate 
of 20.2 percent and a job destruction rate of 18 percent. They conclude that the creation and destruction of jobs shows 
a high reallocation of workers, which is influenced also by some degree of labor flexibility, in particular among small 
establishments. Their results are clearly very large in comparison to our results. For the same period we find a job 
reallocation rate of only 13 percent, which can be due to the exclusion of the random sample of micro and small firms.  
27 Other authors that also state that this crisis had important economic effects are Jemio (2000), Mercado et al. 
(2005) and Chávez and Muriel (2004). 
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percent for production workers in the 1998-1999 period, while it has been only -0.3 percent 
for non-production workers. However, net employment growth for non-production workers 
was negative and low for three consecutive periods, 1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 2000-2001, 
which coincide exactly with the period of economic downturn. 
Figure 3 
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Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
 
This result allows us to state the fourth stylized fact regarding job flows in Bolivia’s 
manufacturing industry. 
Stylized fact 4: Net employment growth is relatively more volatile for non-production 
workers than for production workers, but the destruction of jobs is more severe for 
production workers in periods of economic downturn. 
Next we explore the link between the regulatory environment and job flows by using the 
temporary workers rate as our continuous measure of labor rules enforcement. Figure 4 
displays this variable averaged across firms in each year. The rate of temporary workers 
increased from 7 percent in 1992 to 14 percent in 1995, and then decreased to 5 percent in 
2001. The fall during the economic downturn of 1999-2001 can be associated with a higher 
flexibility to fire temporary workers compared to permanent ones. 
During 2004-2007 the rate displays a large increase, reaching a proportion of 67 percent in 
2007. We notice that this increase matches the evolution of the rigidity of employment 
index, suggesting that the changes of labor regulation rules towards more protection, 
modified firms’ preferences (ceteris paribus) from using less permanent workers to using 
more temporary workers. This means in our terms less enforcement or labor rules. 
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Figure 4 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
 
Figure 5 shows firms classified as those that have low, average or high values of the 
temporary workers rate (i.e. they have been divided into three percentiles). Each firm is 
classified in one of the three categories by computing the mean of the regulation indicator 
across the years in which the firm appears. In this way we avoid having the same firm 
classified differently in different years. 
Figure 5  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 2006 2007
Job reallocation rate by firm proportion of temporary workers
Low Average High  
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004 2006 2007
Net employment growth by firm proportion of temporary 
workers
Low Average High  
Source: author’s calculations based on BAMS. 
 
The most striking result that we can extract from Figure 5 is that labor cost rationing is the 
best that firms can do if we consider the creation and destruction of jobs during periods of 
economic downturn. Observe that firms with a high proportion of temporary workers are 
the only type of firms that contributed positively to the net creation of jobs in the 1998-1999 
period. 
Notice also that in 2001 the contribution to net employment growth by firms with low and 
average share of temporary workers is still negative. But the contribution of firms with a 
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high share of temporary workers is positive and large. In fact it is larger than the negative 
contribution of the other type of firms, so we end up with a positive rate of net employment 
growth in that year. In other words, firms with a high share of temporary workers have been 
able to recover more rapidly form the economic crisis of 1999 and they have been able to 
create more jobs than to eliminate jobs. This is also observed in the left Figure, where the 
contribution of firms with a high proportion of temporary workers to job reallocation was 
almost 60 percent in 2001 and above 70 percent in 2007. 
V.1. Econometric Analysis 
We estimate equation (1) presented in the methodology section. We employ a random 
effects model because we have an unbalanced panel with short periods by firm. The 
estimations also use cluster-robust standard errors by firm for the whole panel.28 The 
results are shown in Table 7 where, besides labor regulation indicators, other relevant 
characteristics were also found to be significant as well as robust to alternative 
specifications. 
The most striking results are presented in regressions one and four, where the coefficient of 
the temporary workers rate is positive and significant at 1 percent, being robust for many 
subsamples  considering only the forced inclusion sample or excluding the years in which 
employment dynamics displayed instability (1994-1995, 1999-2000, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2006)  as well for different estimation methodologies (e.g., fixed effects, feasible least 
squares, etc.).29  
Furthermore, in the regressions three and six we adjust this rate for other production 
characteristics of firms that may explain it: sixteen dummies for manufacturing subsector, 
dummies for firm sizes, gross value of production (in logarithms), and the share of 
temporary workers cost. These variables are included to obtain the residuals from a 
regression for the temporary workers rate − which are orthogonal to these variables – that 
could be interpreted as an adjusted temporary workers rate. This rate is averaged by firm 
over the periods with information. The estimated coefficients of this adjusted rate preserve 
the sign and significance of the previous rate in the regressions. 
The econometric results confirm the previous observation in which we found that firms with 
high temporary worker rates have higher job reallocation rates, showing that employment 
creation and destruction are lower when firm’s preferences for labor regulation enforcement 
− in terms of hiring relatively more permanent workers − are greater, which is consistent 
with the literature (e.g., Haltiwanger et al. 2006, and Kaplan 2009). In addition, we show 
that the net impact of labor regulation has been negative on employment growth. In this 
regard, and considering also the observations made for Figure 5, we state the last stylized 
fact: 
                                                   
28 See Wooldridge (2002), Baltagi and Songs (2006), Greene (2008) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009) for a 
discussion of (unbalanced) panel data estimation methodologies. 
29 These estimations are available by request to the authors. 
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Stylized fact 5: Firms with high temporary worker rates (as an approximation of less 
enforcement of labor rules) have higher job reallocation rates as well as higher net 
employment growth. 
Table 7: Job Flows and Labor Regulation, 1988-01, 2004, 2006-07 
Variables 
Job Reallocation Rate with Net Employment Growth with 
Temporary 
Workers Rate 
Adjusted 
Temporary 
Workers Rate 
Rigidity of 
Employ-ment 
Index 
Temporary 
Workers Rate 
Adjusted 
Temporary 
Workers Rate 
Rigidity of 
Employ-ment 
Index 
)1(ln tEw  -0.0246*** -0.0242*** -0.0242*** -0.0170*** -0.0167*** -0.0166*** 
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
y  growth 0.0229*** 0.0234*** 0.0232*** 0.1725*** 0.1726*** 0.1728*** 
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) 
GDP growth    1.8946*** 2.0502*** 1.9738*** 
    (0.3101) (0.3870) (0.3090) 
Capital intensity -0.5233*** -0.5753*** -0.5522***    
 (0.1750) (0.1913) (0.1779)    
Energy intensity -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Dummy for  main regions    0.0212** 0.0210** 0.0209** 
   (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Dummy for export(average t, t-1) 0.0353*** 0.0387*** 0.0366***    
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115)    
Dummy for micro firm(average 
t, t-1) 
0.0591*** 0.0610*** 0.0606*** -0.0632*** -0.0618*** -0.0616*** 
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0201) 
Dummy for forced inclusion -0.0244*** -0.0250*** -0.0249*** 0.0349*** 0.0352*** 0.0346*** 
(0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) 
Temporary Workers 
Rate(average t, t-1) 
0.0141***   0.0172***   
(0.0052)   (0.0057)   
Rigidity of employment 
index 
 -0.0109   -0.0054  
 (0.0121)   (0.0205)  
Adjusted Temporary 
Workers Rate 
  0.0098**   0.0139*** 
  (0.0041)   (0.0035) 
Constant 0.4196*** 0.4323*** 0.4254*** 0.0754 0.0795 0.0822 
  (0.0422) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0514) (0.0542) (0.0513) 
 Observations 9345 9345 9345 9345 9345 9345 
 R2 overall model 0.1150 0.1117 0.1129 0.0982 0.0963 0.0972 
Notes: i) the methodology of estimations was random with cluster-robust standard errors by firm (2075); ii) in brackets are the standards errors; iii) 
*** means statistical significance at 1%, and ** at 5%; iv) significant dummies by years were included in the regressions: 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000, 
2004, and 2006 for the first three, and 1989-1991, 1993-1995, 1997-1998, 2000, and 2004 for the last three regressions; v) sub-index “t-1” means 
a period before, and “average t, t-1” is the arithmetic average of the variables between t and t-1. 
 
We also analyze the Rigidity of Employment Index (regressions two and five), observing 
that the sign of the coefficients are consistent with the previous results; however, they are 
not statistically significant. 
Table 8 also shows additional relevant results. First we find that GVP growth by firm and 
national GDP growth, included to control for business cycles, have positive coefficients. In 
particular the last three columns confirm pro-cyclicality with employment growth. Second, 
the job reallocation rate is negatively related to capital intensity. It is common that as capital 
usage increases, the job destruction rate decreases. The fact that the job destruction rate 
falls sharply with capital intensity can be related to the prediction of the human capital 
theory of endogenous growth, once we recognize that human capital and physical capital 
tend to be complementary inputs in the production process. More capital-intensive firms 
 22
usually operate with a more human-capital-intensive workforce; we expect them to exhibit 
lower job destruction and reallocation rates. 
Third, the negative and significant relation between job reallocation and energy intensity 
probably reflects the sharp energy price increases that occurred over the sample period 
(compared with other input prices), which led to a systematic shift of resources away from 
more energy-intensive firms. The increase in energy prices occurred because the main 
energy companies were capitalized during the period of implementation of the Second 
Generation Reforms. 
Fourth, the coefficient of a dummy for main regions (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba) 
shows that employment growth is higher in these regions compared to the rest of the 
country; and the dummy for firms that export suggests higher employment volatility in 
these firms. Lastly, as expected, we found that micro firms contribute negatively and 
significantly to the net employment growth rate, because, precisely, these firms have a 
larger job destruction rate. Micro firms in Bolivia are always associated with familiar firms, 
with higher labor flexibility. This means that it is very easy for them to eliminate jobs in case 
of a fall in sales, for example. 
VI. Labor Demand and Regulation 
We estimate equation (5) using random effects from the unbalanced panel for the period 
1988-2007, with cluster-robust standard errors by firm.30 In addition, we include year 
dummies, the Rigidity of Employment variable, and dummies for controlling zero values of 
shares,31 when they are significant at 10 percent level and robust to alternative 
specifications. 
Initially we analyze possible endogeneity problems. The model described above assumes 
implicitly that the quantity of workers does not explain their corresponding salaries at the 
firm level. We evaluate if the registered Bolivian manufacturing firms support this 
hypothesis empirically by applying the Hausman test for endogeneity (see, e.g., Wooldridge 
2002). For each type of job we: i) estimate a salary regression with the exogenous variables 
as regressors; ii) calculate the residuals of this regression; and iii) include these residuals as 
a new variable in the employment share equation. 
For production workers, we find that the coefficient of the residuals is rejected even at 15 
percent of significance, which means that there are no endogeneity problems. However for 
non-production workers the coefficient of the residuals is rejected at 5 percent, but not at 10 
                                                   
30 We select the random effects method for the following reasons: i) the apparent non-correlation between the 
individual effects and the regressors given the theoretical specifications of the functions; ii) the use of firm 
information, much of which is for very few time periods (one or two); and iii) the low variance of the shares over time 
by firm in most cases (see Wooldridge 2002, Baltagi and Songs 2006, Greene 2008, and Cameron and Trivedi 2009, 
for a discussion of (unbalanced) panel data estimation methodologies). Furthermore, we did not use Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression models, which would be advisable for efficiency, because of the lack of software to process the 
system jointly. 
31 All firms have permanent workers, but not all of them contract either production workers or non-production 
workers. 
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percent (Table A.1 in Annex). These results suggest that firms have more power for 
establishing salaries for their production workers than for their non-production workers. 
This is consistent with the Bolivian labor force structure: production workers, usually with 
low levels of education, are relatively abundant in the country, and mostly employed in 
precarious activities. In contrast, non-production workers have higher levels of education, 
are covered by the labor regulation in a higher proportion, and are scarce (see, e.g., Muriel 
and Jemio, 2010; Muriel and Ferrufino, 2012). 
We estimate the share equation for non-production workers with and without instrumental 
variables to evaluate the significance of the possible endogeneity problem. We use as 
instruments firm sizes: dummies for micro and large firms. According to the Wald test, we 
find that the coefficients estimated for salaries for the two methodologies (using and not 
using instruments) are not statistically different. Thus we maintain the hypothesis derived 
from the model of non-endogeneity (see Table A.2 in Appendix). 
Table 9 shows the results of the final estimations for labor variables (see Table A.2 in Annex 
for the estimation of capital and intermediate consumption equations). 
Table 8: Employment and Salaries Equations, 1988-2001, 2004, 2006-2007 
Variables Us  Uwln  Ss  Swln  
Uwln  0.0440  -0.0067  
 (0.0021)***  (0.0005)***  
Swln  -0.0021  0.0414  
  (0.0004)***  (0.0017)***  
qln  -0.0036 0.0892 -0.1034 0.0826 
  (0.0008)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0064)*** 
Kwln  -0.1426  -0.0192   
  (0.0121)***  (0.0051)***   
Mwln  -0.0217  -0.0155  
  (0.0062)***  (0.0008)***  
yln  -0.0241  -0.2551  
  (0.0011)***  (0.0143)***  
Rigidity of Employment -0.0097    
 (0.0043)**    
Constant 0.0750 0.0079 0.0527 0.0871 
  (0.0203)*** (0.0213) (0.0159)*** (0.0126)*** 
Observations 13635 13635 13635 13635 
R2 overall model 0.3405 0.9311 0.3643 0.9547 
Notes: i) The methodology of estimations is random effects with cluster-robust standard errors by firm (3142); ii) In 
brackets are the standard errors, *** means statistical significance at 1%, and ** at 5%; iii) significant dummies by 
years are included in the regressions, 1989-1991 and 1994 for the Us regression, 1996, 1998-2001 and 2007 
for
Uwln , 1989-1990, 1993, and 2004 for S
s , and 1997-2001 for 
Swln ; iv) in the first two regressions (last two 
regressions) a dummy is included when permanent employment is positive, but production workers (non-production 
workers) is reported as zero. 
 
The coefficient of the Rigidity of Employment Index is statistically significant, and robust to 
alternative specifications, for production workers. This shows a negative impact of labor 
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protection on employment demand, which should be more important since 2006, when the 
job security policy changed towards greater protection. 
Table 10 presents the employment-salary elasticities calculated from equation (11) as well as 
from the econometric results described in Table 9. The estimations show that, ceteris 
paribus, an increase of 1 percent in labor costs will decrease demand for production workers 
by 0.49 percent, and demand for non-production workers by 0.43 percent. In this regard, 
the impact of labor regulation costs are extremely significant if we take into account that, on 
average, they increase the basic salary by 50.76 percent for production workers and by 
50.94 percent for non-production workers.32 This means that firms that only pay basic 
salaries in the manufacturing sector should increase their labor costs by approximately 51 
percent if they decide to be subject to the labor regulation costs. However, entry firms may 
transfer part of these costs to workers.  Certainly, the high level of labor regulation costs is 
one reason that explains why there is a large number of micro-sized and informal firms in 
Bolivia who choose to stay at this scale due to the formal costs associated with their growth. 
Table 9: Elasticities and Labor Regulation Impact, 1988-2001, 2004, 2006-2007 
 Employment-salary 
Elasticity 
Job Losses due to Labor Regulation 
Due to the Basic  
Salary Policy (2) 
Due to the New 
Pension Law(3) 
Production Workers 
Average(1) -0.4988 -5.65% -1.21% 
Minimum(1) -0.5351 -6.06% -1.30% 
Maximum(1) -0.4626 -5.23% -1.12% 
U  50.76% 50.76% 54.15% 
(%) increase in Uw   11.32% 0.00% 
Non-production Workers 
Average(1) -0.4278 -4.82% -1.03% 
Minimum(1)  -0.4680 -5.27% -1.13% 
Maximum(1) -0.3877 -4.37% -0.93% 
S  50.94% 50.94% 54.15% 
(%) increase in Sw   11.27% 0.00% 
Notes: (1) elasticities are calculated using the expression SUis
s
i
i
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ˆ


 , the average corresponds to the 
estimated coefficient 
iiˆ , the maximum and minimum represent, respectively, the lower and upper bounds of the confidence 
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. 
In addition, Table 10 presents two micro-simulations for evaluating the changes in 
regulation during the last years, which were previously described: the basic salary 
mandatory increase and the social costs increase as a result of the new pension system. 
                                                   
32 In this case the average rate of labor payments derived from the regulation considers only firms with positive 
workers for each category compared to Table 6. 
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The first economic policy was implemented in order to maintain real salaries in relation to 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which increased mainly because of the prices growth of 
food products. In 2006-2009 the basic salary had a mandatory growth of 29.36 percent. 
However, most manufacturing prices changed less than it, reaching a growth of 18.08 
percent, on average, for the 16 subsectors.33 This information allows estimating the 
difference between these prices at the firm level, which reaches 11 percent as shown in Table 
10. 
One way to evaluate this policy is to consider the impact of this difference in prices (ceteris 
paribus), which would correspond to the labor cost increase in 2006-2009. Although this 
policy is desirable for maintaining living standards, the simulation shows that it entails 
costs in terms of job losses, 5.7 percent for production workers and 4.8 percent for non-
production workers. 
The second policy was conceived to collect more resources for the pension system, focused 
on favoring contributors that, for diverse reasons, do not reach a minimum retirement 
pension. One main problem of this rule is that it increases the rate of labor regulation costs 
( i ) by 3.4 percent per year, representing in practice a direct tax on employment paid by 
firms. Therefore this policy is not only distorting (i.e. generates inefficiency) but also affects 
directly and negatively labor demand of firms subject to labor regulation. 
We evaluate this second policy only through is direct impact on labor demand (ceteris 
paribus). This means varying the rate of i
 
in equation (11) to obtain the corresponding 
elasticity: ii
i
ic
i
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i
x
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
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1 . The results show that this policy decreases employment demand 
by 1.2 percent for production workers and by 1.0 percent for non-production workers. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that the magnitude of the negative effects of both labor policies 
in terms of job losses are significant if we compare them with the net employment growth, 
described in Table 5, that reached, on average, 3.96 percent by year. 
VII. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This paper shows that Bolivian labor regulation have a negative impact on employment. We 
analyze this effect through job flows and labor demand estimations, using data for 
registered manufacturing firms between 1988 and 2007. 
Initially we explore the main stylized facts emerging from job flows alone, observing that 
they have relatively low magnitudes compared with the experiences of other countries (see 
Davis et al. 1996). In addition, net employment increases at different average rates during 
the period of analysis, following the business cycles to some extent. In particular, more jobs 
were destroyed than created in the economic recession period of 1998-1999, and the highest 
net employment growth rate is observed in the economic expansion period of 2006-2007. 
We also find that net employment growth is relatively more volatile for non-production 
                                                   
33 We match the production price growth of the firm by the implicit price growth of the gross value of production of its 
corresponding subsector, according to the input-output matrix classification. 
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workers than for production workers, but the destruction of jobs is more severe for 
production workers in periods of economic downturn. 
Interesting results are obtained by comparing the job flow indicators and the proxy variable 
of labor regulation: the rate between temporary workers and permanent salaried workers. 
This rate has a positive relationship with both the job reallocation rate and net employment 
growth. This means that firms with higher proportion of temporary employees create more 
net permanent workers positions, despite having more degrees of freedom to lay off them, 
because this somehow eases labor costs for firms. 
The contribution of firms with a high level of temporary workers to the job reallocation rate 
has been increasing over time, in part due to the 1999 crisis, with these firms recovering 
quickly the following year, while firms with low levels of temporary workers continued 
contributing negatively to the net employment growth rate in the following years. 
The labor demand functions estimations permits to obtain employment-salary elasticities, 
which show that an increase of 1 percent in labor costs decreases production workers’ 
demand by 0.49 percent and non-production workers’ demand by 0.43 percent. The impact 
of labor regulation costs becomes extremely significant if we take into account that, on 
average, it raises the basic salary by nearly 51 percent. Certainly the high level of labor 
regulation costs is one reason that explains why there are a large number of firms in Bolivia 
who choose to be small and informal (in legal terms), paying only a basic salary.  
Furthermore, through the inclusion of an indicator that estimates the rigidity of 
employment, we find that labor protection has a negative impact on production workers 
demand. This effect becomes more relevant since 2006 with the greater labor protection 
rules. 
Lastly, we present two micro-simulations for evaluating regulation changes in recent years: 
the basic salary mandatory increase in 2006-2009, and the labor costs increase as a result of 
the new pension system since 2010. In the first case, the exercise shows that the salary 
increase entailed costs in terms of job losses of 5.7 percent for production workers and of 
4.8 percent for non-production workers; and in the second case, employment demand 
decreased by 1.2 percent for production workers, and by 1.0 percent for non-production 
workers. 
The negative impact of labor regulation on permanent employment shows the need to think 
on alternative rules.  Certainly, welfare benefits and costs of each possible policy should be 
evaluated carefully; however, we want to discuss the following policy recommendations: i) 
some degree of flexibility for permanent employment (subject to labor regulation), and ii) a 
salary policy more linked to labor productivity. 
For attaining flexibility for permanent employment, we propose three alternatives. The first 
alternative is the bank of hours, which has been applied in Brazil since 1988 (see, e.g, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 2004). This policy consists of adjusting the working 
hours to production/sales needs of the firms, reducing the working hours during days of low 
 27 
business activity, and accumulating credits in hours for periods of high production/sales. 
The monthly basic salary does not change over time, and all conditions of credits and 
liabilities in working hours should be negotiated between employers and employees. This 
policy will reduce in part the need to hire temporary workers in periods of high 
production/sales. 
The second alternative is to properly regulate the compliance of the labor contracts. 
Currently this issue has many loopholes, and is excessive bureaucratic in solving any 
conflict, prejudicing both employees and employers. Certainly one of the main reasons for 
dismissing employees is their low performance or negligence at work, which should be 
clearly established in labor contracts. In this regard, a simple and applicable regulation will 
reduce the risk of contracting and maintaining permanently this kind of workers (with the 
consequent positive effects on permanent employment demand). 
Third, we propose to generate specific rules for permanent employment in economic 
downturn periods, which would imply, among other policies, reducing working hours, and 
dismissing workers with a basic unemployment insurance supported also by the 
government. 
For the case of a salary policy according to labor productivity we propose the following. 
First we believe that the premise behind Bolivian labor regulation must be changed; which 
is that “given that employers aim to exploit workers, employees must be protected”. For 
instance, new currents of thought believe that when workers feel happy at work (and 
certainly not exploited) are more productive. In addition, more productive workers that 
“feel exploited” will have more probability of quitting the job compared with less productive 
workers, because the former most likely will find a better job. In this regard, Bolivian 
government should promote the valuing of employees, as key assets for firms, changing the 
vision of many labor rules. 
Second, under a perspective of employees as key assets of firms, bonus should focus on 
productivity and production bonuses. In this regard, we propose to maintain the Christmas 
bonus, seniority and monthly border area bonus, and to merge the profit bonus, the non-
compulsory production bonus, the quinquennium, and the monthly Sunday, in a bonus that 
reflects more properly productivity and performance. 
Lastly, we recommend avoiding, as far as possible, mandatory increases in real labor costs. 
Tax theory shows that this kind of direct tax has adverse effects on labor demand, they are 
distortionary as has been proven empirically in this paper. In particular, the new social cost 
associated with the new pension system should be financed by other kind of tax or taxes. 
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Appendix A: The Data 
The sample selection methodology, based on SIN records, consists of the stratification of 
firms that have more than 5 employees by both forced inclusion and random sample 
inclusion. The first stratification incorporates firms with 15-49 employees (medium-sized) 
and firms with more than 49 employees (large size). The second stratification includes firms 
with 5-14 employees (small size). 
The selection procedure was year-by-year in the case of the random sample inclusion, where 
firms selected in a year were independent from those in another year. Nevertheless, the 
selection of firms under forced inclusion was not year-independent. According to the 
characteristics of the information, the INE made assumptions when there was no 
information for a firm in period t but the firm was in business in that period. The data of a 
firm in period t-1 were used for the assumptions. The identification criteria for the 
assumptions were the economic stratum, the ISIC number at 4-digit disaggregation, the 
employment category, and the location (department). For instance, the assumption of gross 
production value (y) of a firm was made according to the procedure that follows. First, the 
variation of the gross production value V(y) was computed according to:
 



1,
,
)(
tj
tj
y
y
yV ; 
for firm j that had information in t and t-1. Second, the gross production value without 
information in period t was computed as: )(1,, yVyy tjtj   . Once the gross production 
value was estimated, other relevant variables were calculated by using the technical 
coefficients generated by the information of the same firm from t-1. 
The BAMS is based on the bookkeeping registries and balance sheets of the firms, and has 
national coverage, i.e. it includes the nine departments.34 The survey was implemented 
approximately 8 months after the bookkeeping period concluded. The available information 
generally corresponds to the bookkeeping year of the firms (12 months), which begins on 
April 1st and ends on March 30th, or goes from January 1st to December 31st. 
                                                   
34 The Department of Pando, however, did not have any manufacturing firms registered in some years, and at most 3 
in others. 
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Table A.1: Labor Demand Equations with Salary Residuals as Regressors,  
1988-2001, 2004, 2006-2007 
Variables Us  Us  Ss Ss
Utˆ (coefficient for 
residuals of 
Uwln ) 
-0.0075 -0.0061   
(0.0055) (0.0050)   
stˆ (coefficient for 
residuals of 
swln ) 
  -0.0075 -0.0077 
  (0.0042)* (0.0040)* 
Controls for shares and 
salaries regressions 
All exogenous 
variables and 
dummies 
Only significant 
variables and 
dummies 
All exogenous 
variables and 
dummies 
Only significant 
variables and 
dummies 
 Observations 13635 13635 13635 13635 
Notes: i) The methodology of estimations was random effects with cluster-robust standard errors by firm 
(3142); ii) in brackets are the standard errors; iii) * means statistical significance at 10%.  
 
 
Table A.2: Remaining Equations, 1988-2001, 2004, 2006-07 
Variables Ss (IV) Ks  Ms  
Uwln  -0.006 0.0015 -0.0132 
 (0.0005)*** (0.0006)** (0.0009)*** 
Swln  0.0453 0.0024 -0.0130 
  (0.0029)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0006)*** 
qln  -0.003 0.0029  
  (0.0007)*** (0.0015)*  
Kwln  -0.118 0.3506 -0.1458 
  (0.0085)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0160)*** 
Mwln  -0.026 -0.0470 0.0707 
  (0.0054)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0115)*** 
yln  -0.015 -0.0242 0.0564 
  (0.0163)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0020)*** 
Constant -0.006 1.3099 -0.4634 
  (0.0005) (0.0372)*** (0.0462)*** 
 Observations 13635 13635 13635 
R2 overall model 0.3238 0.0655  0.1325 
Notes: i) The methodology of estimations is random effects with cluster-robust standard errors by 
firm (3142); ii) in brackets are the standard errors, *** means statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, 
and * at 10%; iii) significant dummies by years are included in the regressions, 1996, 1998-2001 and 
2007 for Ss , 1990, 1992-1995 and 1997 for Ks , and 1991-1995,1997, 1999 and 2001 for Ms ; iv) in 
the first regression instrumental variables (dummies for micro and large firms) are used for 
Swln ; 
and v) in the first regression dummy is included when permanent employment is positive but non-
production workers is reported as zero. 
 
 
 
 
